|
|
От
|
Begletz
|
|
|
К
|
ЖУР
|
|
|
Дата
|
11.02.2011 23:43:05
|
|
|
Рубрики
|
WWII;
|
|
Сон разума пораждает мифотворчество
См в списке "забытых битв" у Гланца:
Offensive Operations into Belorussia in Fall 1943 and Winter 1944
German and Soviet historians cover in detail the dramatic series of Soviet offensives which followed the Kursk defense in July 1943 and the subsequent Soviet advance to the Dnepr River from August through October 1943. Volumes have been written on Operations “Suvorov,” “Rumiantsev,” and “Kutuzov” at Orel, Belgorod-Kharkov, and Smolensk. Equal attention has been devoted to the various phases of the Chernigov-Poltava operation, operations designed to breech the Dnepr River line (the Chernigov-Pripiat, Kiev, Gomel-Rechitsa, Krivoi Rog, and Nikopol operations), and operations on the flanks, such as the Nevel and Melitopol operations. The Germans, quite naturally, focus on Soviet failures, such as the unsuccessful multiple attempts to crush their Nikopol bridgehead. Thereafter, Soviet accounts focus on their successful and spectacular advance into the Ukraine, commencing with the Zhitornir-Berdichev operation in December 1943 and culminating with their encirclement of the German 1st Panzer Army during the Proskurov-Chernovits operation and the arrival of Soviet forces along the borders of Romania and southern Poland in April. 1944. Lost in this coverage are important and repeated Soviet attempts to conquer Belorussia in late fall 1943 and early winter 1944.
The Belorussian Strategic Offensive (November 1943–February 1944)
The general outlines of this offensive can be pieced together from a wide variety of scattered Soviet sources. Portions of the initial operations to liberate Belorussia are covered in detail under the rubric of the continuation of the Nevel operation by 1st Baltic Front and the Gomel-Rechitsa operation of the Belorussian Front. The overall Stavka plan, probably formulated in early November, called for 1st Baltic Front to strike from its salient west of Nevel southward to Polotsk and west of Vitebsk to destroy the German Vitebsk Group in concert with Western Front attacks on the Orsha and Bogushevsk axes. Simultaneously, Belorussian Front forces would advance from their Dnepr bridgeheads near Loev along the Rechitsa-Bobruisk axis toward Minsk, supported on the right by Western Front forces attacking through Rogachev. One source set out the intent of the Stavka plan by quoting from a 1 October Stavka order: “While delivering the main blow in the general direction of Zhlobin, Bobruisk, and Minsk, destroy the enemy Zhlobin-Bobruisk group and secure the capital of Belorussia, Minsk. Detach a separate group of forces to attack along the northern bank of the Pripiat River in the direction of Kalinkovichi and Zhitkovichi.”23 In his memoirs, K. N. Galitsky, commander of 1st Baltic Front’s 11th Guards Army, also spells out initial Stavka intent to “isolate the Vitebsk-Gorodok enemy grouping,” according to another source apparently in concert with an airborne operation into Belorussia.24
Obviously, the airborne operation was canceled, and the intended strategic offensive failed for a number of reasons, including bad weather and intense German resistance. Soviet historians have written about the series of operations west of Nevel, the Gorodok operations of November and December 1943, the Gomel-Rechitsa operation of November, and the Rogachev-Zhlobin operation of February 1944. They have been utterly silent, however, concerning subsequent operations by 1st Baltic and Belorussian Fronts during the period and until recently, have ignored entirely operations by Western Front. Soviet military encyclopedic literature ignores the operations, and the recent Krivosheev volume fails to mention losses in these additional operations and the overall losses of participating fronts during the lengthy period. The only exception to this neglect is the recent important revelations by M. A. Gareev concerning the multiple failed operations by Western Front during this period.25
German unit histories, memoirs, and archival materials, however, amply attest to the scope, intensity, and duration of Soviet offensive efforts against German forces in Belorussia during this entire period.26 Unless additional Soviet materials become available, the history of these operations will, of necessity, once again have to be based on German sources alone.
Т е если не хотите муссирования подобных историй в народных байках, идите в архивы и пишите книжки, а то попрятались за широкую спину Исаева и разговоры тут разговаривают, панимаш.
(Гланц писал это в 1997 г, так что имел лишь 1е изд Кривошеева)