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22.09.2006 13:54:02
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Современность;
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Конец контроля над стратегическими вооружениями
Статека с Джейна вот попалась
Кратко - Россия не согласна с тем что возможно
не будет иметь возможности уничтожить США при необходимости,
а американцы и их союзники соответсвенно нагло инвестируют
в перспективные разработки. Ну и есть надежда что договорятся.
Автора у статейки нет.
JANE'S INTELLIGENCE DIGEST - SEPTEMBER 22, 2006
End of Russian-US strategic arms control?
Neither Russia nor the US is genuinely interested in achieving a new bilateral strategic arms control agreement, according to an unidentified senior official at the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD). Speaking to reporters in late August, the official also repeated an argument made earlier by Defence Minster Sergei Ivanov that the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which prevents only Russia and the US from having ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5,000 km, was a Cold War relic in a world where any other country could deploy such weapons.
Citing the Bush administration's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002, the MoD representative warned: "If there is a pressing need, Russia will pull out of the Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (ISRM) (INF) Treaty unilaterally."
Moscow's attack
These statements represent only the latest of several Russian declarations denouncing the Bush administration's defence policies. In a speech in May to the Russian Federal Assembly, President Vladimir Putin warned about US plans to develop "a whole arsenal of destabilising weapons" like space-based nuclear systems, very small-yield nuclear warheads and long-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads. Decrying what he termed the general "stagnation" in Russian-US arms control, President Putin subsequently called for a renewed dialogue, with priority given to replacing the 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) before it expires at the end of 2009.
Russian representatives also have expressed increasing alarm about US ballistic missile defence programmes, which they claim ultimately seek to negate Russia's missile fleet. In April, Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov, commander of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, said: "The projected scale of the missile defence system being deployed by the US is so substantial that concerns about its negative impact on Russia's nuclear deterrence potential are entirely well-founded; this could disrupt strategic stability."
The following month, General Yuri Baluyevskiy, Chief of the Russian General Staff, said that someone had to be ignorant of geography not to see that the only logical target for the US ballistic missile defence programmes systems planned for deployment in Poland and its neighbours would be missiles launched from Russia rather than Iran. Russian officials have claimed that the US could secretly convert missile interceptor launchers based in Eastern Europe to launch offensive ballistic missiles against Russia without the approval of the host governments.
Throughout 2006, President Putin and other Russian officials have justified their decision to deploy a new generation of offensive strategic weapons by citing the need to counter US ballistic missile defence programmes. In a 31 January news conference, Putin boasted that Russia had developed a new strategic missile that could change course in flight and, thanks to its unpredictable trajectory, overcome existing ballistic missile defence systems. In May, Gen Baluyevskiy said that exercises conducted in February 2006 had confirmed the effectiveness of Russia's new ballistic missile defence programmes penetration technologies. Nevertheless, the capabilities and affordability of these systems remains uncertain.
Washington's defence
Members of the Bush administration, however, have repeatedly indicated that they consider comprehensive strategic arms control treaties largely irrelevant in today's world, where threats from transnational terrorists and rogue states have become far more important than fears of a Russian-US confrontation.
US officials argue that implementation of the May 2002 Russian-American Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) will stabilise their military relationship since it provides for major reductions in their nuclear arsenals - to between 1,700 and 2,200 "operationally deployed strategic warheads" by 31 December 2012. In January 2006, US National Nuclear Security Administration head Linton Brooks said: "Very detailed technical arms control agreements are not the future of our relationship with the Russian Federation."
The Bush administration has also rebuffed Russian efforts to adopt additional operational arms control agreements or curtail development of defences against both ballistic and cruise missiles. Despite Moscow's entreaties, Washington has refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and opposes efforts by Russia and others to broaden restrictions on military activities in space.
The administration also continues to examine options for developing "mini-nukes" and conventionally armed inter-continental ballistic missiles, notwithstanding continuing Russian protests. Proposals for more operational arms control - such as lowering the readiness of strategic forces, restricting ballistic missile launching submarines (SSBNs) on patrol, and separating nuclear warheads from their means of delivery - have also not gained much support within the administration.
Despite Russian objections, the US and its allies continue to invest heavily in their ballistic missile defence development programmes. In May, a four-year Nato Missile Defence Feasibility Study concluded that the alliance could construct a ballistic missile defence system capable of providing defence against the growing missile threat from Iran, Syria and North Korea. US officials also cite the need to help defend non-European allies, such as Israel and Japan, against regional missile threats.
A ray of hope
One mitigating factor is that, as the MoD Russian official admitted, Moscow also did not consider negotiating another comprehensive bilateral arms control agreement as a priority. Russian representatives recognise that without their massive nuclear force, their status could decline to that of any large energy exporting country. When asked why Russia deserved to be in the G8, President Putin told a January press conference: "The G8 is a club which addresses global problems and, first and foremost, security problems. Can someone in this hall imagine resolving, shall we say, problems concerning global nuclear security without the participation of the largest nuclear power in the world, the Russian Federation? Of course not." President Putin and other Russian officials also believe that Russia cannot afford to wage a comprehensive arms race with the US, but must instead rely on less costly asymmetric means such as nuclear weapons.
The need to verify SORT will probably sustain a modicum of Russian-US co-operation in the area of strategic weapons. The treaty lacks its own verification provisions, and both governments have been relying on START I in their absence. This accord - with its extensive data exchange requirements, on-site inspection, and other compliance measures - expires in December 2009. Without a new agreement, the two countries will have to rely primarily on less effective national means of verification after the expiration date. For this reason, the two governments must soon decide whether to augment the START I verification provisions or simply extend them beyond 2009.