Вкратце - было запущено пять модифицированных "Скадов" различных версий (Scud-B/-C/-ER) с мобильных ПУ из разных мест, пресловутая "МБР" Taepo Dong 2 с ракетного полигона Мусудан, и одна неопознанная ракета (возможно, No Dong). Ракета Taepo Dong 2 взорвалась через 42 сек после старта.
JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY - JULY 12, 2006
North Korea launches missiles, Taepo Dong 2 explodes
JOSEPH S BERMUDEZ; JDW Analyst;
Colorado
North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) conducted a series of ballistic missile tests, launching a total of six missiles during the early hours of 5 July. Initial reports indicate that these six systems consisted of one Taepo Dong 2 and five 'Scud'-class (-B/-C/-ER) missiles. As JDW went online, a seventh, as yet unidentified missile, was fired at 0822 (GMT).
The exercise commenced at 0333 hrs (local time) with the launch of a 'Scud'-class missile. This was followed by the launch of a second 'Scud' at 0404 hrs. Both systems flew east on a trajectory towards the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. After travelling approximately 250-300 km, they impacted the East Sea (Sea of Japan) in an area 500 km from Hokkaido and 200 km southeast of Vladivostok. One missile impacted further north and closer to Vladivostok, while the other impacted further east, closer to Japan. Both these missiles were apparently launched from either transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) or mobile-erector-launchers (MELs), neither of which were located at the Musudan-ni Missile Launch Facility.
One hour later at, 0501 hrs, the North Koreans launched the long-awaited Taepo Dong 2 from its Musudan-ni Missile Launch Facility, which is located in Hwadae-gun on the northeast coast about 100 km south of the port city of Ch'ongjin. Forty-two seconds after a successful lift-off, there was a catastrophic failure of the first stage, which resulted in the destruction of the system. This would suggest that the missile was at a height of 15-20 km and 10-15 km down range. The debris from the explosion was scattered over the East Sea off the North Korean coast.
While the cause of the Taepo Dong 2 failure is as yet unknown, it is believed to have occurred at a time when the guidance system was adjusting the trajectory to a more easterly course. It may also have been related to the first stage engines, as the North Koreans have had problems with them in the past. A failed Taepo Dong 2 engine test was observed at the Musudan-ni Missile Launch Facility in April 2004.
During the next hour, an additional three 'Scud'-class missiles (with possibly one being a No Dong) were launched from either TELs or MELs, following a trajectory towards Hokkaido, and impacted in the East Sea.
This missile exercise is notable for several reasons:
1 It is the first launch attempt for the Taepo Dong 2;
2 It is the largest ever North Korean ballistic missile exercise to date. Prior to this, the May 1993 exercise was the largest with the launch of four missiles - three 'Scud' B/Cs and one No Dong;
3 Most of the exercise was conducted in the early morning, apparently so as to both restrict foreign intelligence-gathering capabilities and achieve an element of surprise.
There is some concern that North Korea might test additional systems in the near future.
While the test exercise was completed around dawn on 5 July, there is some concern that North Korea might test additional systems in the near future.
One question that remains unanswered is whether the Taepo Dong 2 was the ballistic missile variant or a space launch vehicle carrying a new North Korean satellite (such as Kwangmyongsong 2).
Long-range missile systems
During the early 1990s, North Korea initiated development of at least three ambitious ballistic missile systems that would become known in the West as the Taepo Dong 1, Taepo Dong 2 and BM-25 (the national designations are unknown). The initial design objectives for the Taepo Dong 1 appear to have been for a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) system, which could deliver a 500-1,000 kg warhead to a range of 1,500-2,700 km. The Taepo Dong 2 would carry the same warhead to 4,600-6,000 km, classifying it as either an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) or intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM). Either system could achieve considerably greater ranges if the warhead was significantly reduced.
The Taepo Dong 2 is variously reported as either a two- or three-stage system. The confusion may arise from the possibility of its being used as a space launch vehicle for a new North Korean satellite, but this remains to be confirmed. The system appears to be constructed by utilising a newly designed first stage (possibly employing a cluster of three modified No Dong engines) and a No Dong variant as the second stage. It is approximately 32 m long and weighs 64.3 tons.
The final system is the BM-25: a 2,500-4,000 km MRBM/IRBM believed to be based on the decommissioned Soviet R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). While the BM-25 is still under development and has yet to be tested, technology and components have reportedly been shared with Iran.
Intelligence collection
Increased activity at the Musudan-ni Missile Launch Facility was first observed by the US in May, suggesting the possibility of a forthcoming missile test. This was accompanied by the movement of Korean People's Navy vessels into the East Sea and increased activity by the Korean People's Air Force. By the end of June, final preparations for the launch of the Taepo Dong 2 were completed and US and Japanese surveillance assets moved into position.
The test was reportedly tracked by US aircraft such as an RC-135 Cobra Ball and ships of the US Navy (including the converted Compass Island-class missile range instrumentation ship USNS Observation Island), as well as Japanese Navy Aegis-equipped vessels and YS-11E electronic intelligence-gathering aircraft. Following the test, both the US Navy and Japan Self Defence Forces deployed naval vessels and patrol aircraft to search the impact area for wreckage of the missiles.
It is likely that this intelligence-collection effort, both before and during the test launches, will provide a considerable body of new information concerning both the missile systems themselves and the Korean People's Army missile unit operations.
Success or failure?
While the Taepo Dong 2 failed shortly after lift-off, it is likely to still have provided the North Koreans with valuable experience and some limited data collection. Both of these will be funneled into future developments of the system. Additionally, the successful launching of six 'Scud'-class missiles (possibly including one No Dong) demonstrates that Korean People's Army missile units have achieved a significant level of operational readiness and that the missile systems are developmentally mature.
