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Рубрики WWII; ВВС; Версия для печати

Возвращаясь к роли тяжелых бомбардировщиков в успехе оперции КОБРА

Только что появилась новая публикация именно на эту тему:

https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/operation-cobra-follow-up-to-dday-invasion/

Признавая ощутимые потери самих американцев, авторы приводят аргументы в пользу того, что на 50% прорыв был обеспечен именно этим:

Was the Operation Worth the Price?

Both Montgomery and Bradley recognized the utility of using heavy bombers in support of ground troops, but the failure of Allied heavy bombers to break the back of German resistance at Caen (causing considerable collateral damage to French civilian and friendly troops) did not deter Bradley from using them at St. Lo. Although friendly-fire casualties did occur in both operations, it was a relatively small price to pay considering the overall stakes. In July 1944, the breakout of Normandy had stalled, and without a determined Allied combined-arms offensive the very existence of a Second Front was endangered.

Operation Cobra vividly illustrated the firepower heavy bombers could bring in support of ground troops. Although an inexact science in the summer of 1944, the close air support operations in Normandy were the precursor to heavy bombers being used in later ground support missions in the European Theatre and later in Korea, Vietnam, and the recent Gulf War. Heavy bombers have proved a powerful addition to the arsenal of ground commanders, providing critical offensive mass at crucial moments.

Вот и признания Байерляйна:

The effect of the bombing on the already understrength Panzer Lehr Division was significant. The German division commander, Lt. Gen. Fritz Bayerlein, described the scene outside of St. Lo in a postwar interrogation: “It was hell…. The planes kept coming overhead like a conveyer belt, and the bomb carpets came down…. My front lines looked like a landscape of the moon, and at least seventy percent of personnel were out of action—dead, wounded, crazed, or numb.” Bayerlein placed the actual losses of dead and wounded at approximately 50 percent by bombing, 30 percent by artillery, and 20 percent by other weapons.

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